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ON DISARMAMENT

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held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

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COLLECTION

Chairman:

U. MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

| | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>Brazil:</u> | Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA |
| | Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS |
| | Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES |
| | Mrs. C. BIDART |
| <u>Bulgaria:</u> | Mr. C. LUKANOV |
| | Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV |
| | Mr. D. POPOV |
| | Mr. T. DANILOV |
| <u>Burma:</u> | U MAUNG MAUNG GYI |
| <u>Canada:</u> | Mr. E. L. M. BURNS |
| | Mr. C. J. MARSHALL |
| | Mr. P. D. LEE |
| <u>Czechoslovakia:</u> | Mr. Z. CERNIK |
| | Mr. V. VAJNAR |
| | Mr. R. KLEIN |
| <u>Ethiopia:</u> | Mr. A. ABERRA |
| | Mr. A. ZELLEKE |
| | Mr. B. ASSFAW |
| <u>India:</u> | Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI |
| | Mr. K. P. JAIN |
| <u>Italy:</u> | Mr. F. CAVALLETTI |
| | Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI |
| | Mr. S. AVETTA |
| | Mr. F. SCRO |
| <u>Mexico:</u> | Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO |
| | Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS |
| <u>Nigeria:</u> | Mr. G. C. IJEWERE |
| | Mr. M. B. BRIMAH |
| <u>Poland:</u> | Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN |
| | Mr. E. STANIEWSKI |
| | Mr. B. KAJDY |

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. MYRDAL
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROZHCHIN
Mr. Y. M. VORONTSOV
Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. G. BREAN
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the two hundred and seventh-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Speaking as representative of Burma, I should like to welcome Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden and Mr. Fisher of the United States of America. I am sure I speak for the whole Committee when I say that we are glad to see them back with us and that their return here is an added encouragement to our work.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, who are taking part in our meeting.

In a number of recent statements on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it has rightly been pointed out that a prerequisite for the achievement of progress in our negotiations is the elucidation of certain questions of principle. That is why I should like to explain once more today the point of view of the Czechoslovak delegation on some of these questions. I must say at once, however, that some of the statements which we have heard recently, instead of helping to clarify the position, have rather contributed to making the basic problems more obscure. They point out far-fetched obscurities and are designed to divert the negotiations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons into a path which cannot lead to our objective.

That situation can be observed even in regard to such a basic question as the definition of the very essence of non-proliferation, the definition of what is and what is not proliferation of nuclear weapons. This question was raised once again, for example, in the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, at the meeting of the Committee held on 5 July (ENDC/PV.270, pp.30 et seq.). We consider that the answer to this question derives to a considerable extent from the circumstances which led to the emergence of the demand for the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That demand was formulated some years ago when it was already obvious that in the near future further States would be able in various ways to acquire the capability to start a nuclear war. The governments of a number of States then directed their attention to the adoption of measures for averting such a danger.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

One of the steps that could help towards achieving that objective would be the adoption of effective measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Of course, such a step would not in itself signify a comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament; it would not entirely eliminate all danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. It would, however, prevent the capability to start a nuclear war from being acquired by still further States in addition to the existing nuclear Powers. Measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons would at the same time make it possible to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by further States. Such proliferation would seriously complicate further negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The desire to prevent new States from acquiring the capability to start a nuclear war is, in our opinion, the basis that gave rise to the proposal for the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the meeting on 5 July Lord Chalfont said (ibid., p.28) that before preparing any treaty we should ask ourselves what we want to achieve by it. In regard to the treaty on non-proliferation, what I have just said provides the answer to his question. That is the basic aspect, the basic criterion which must be applied in the first place when drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is the light in which the two draft treaties before the Committee must be assessed.

The application of this basic criterion clearly reveals the weaknesses, the restrictedness and the ineffectiveness of the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1). In fact, this draft replaces the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the question of control over nuclear weapons. Moreover, in the United States draft control is artificially restricted to the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State. This concept was defended by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, in his statement of 5 July when he said:

"Proliferation takes place if non-nuclear States acquire, either individually or collectively, the right or ability to use nuclear weapons by their own independent choice, that is, without a veto by a nuclear State."

(ENDC/PV.270, p.30)

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation and the delegations of other States have already shown by many facts that such a definition of proliferation of nuclear weapons is inadmissibly narrow and restricted. This becomes quite clear if one compares that definition with what from the very first has been the basic objective of the proposals for the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons: namely, to prevent further States from acquiring nuclear weapons in any form and from being able in any way to start a nuclear war. These possibilities are far from being exhausted by the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of one of the existing nuclear Powers.

The present-day situation testifies that there are a good many such possibilities. Not only a State which had obtained nuclear weapons by manufacturing them itself, or into whose independent national control such weapons had been transferred by one of the existing nuclear States, would have the capability to start a nuclear war. A State to which nuclear weapons had been transferred on condition that the firing of them was restricted by the right of "veto" of the aforesaid nuclear State would have a similar capability. The same applies in the main to a State which, through any form of so-called integration of nuclear armaments within the framework of groupings of nuclear and non-nuclear States, obtained access to the nuclear weapons of an existing nuclear State, and in particular the possibility of participating in decisions on nuclear arming and on the use of the nuclear potential of that State.

The draft treaty submitted by the United States does not preclude the possibility that a non-nuclear State which had assumed an obligation under a non-proliferation treaty might start a nuclear war with the agreement or on the instructions of the nuclear Power which had transferred the nuclear weapons to it, or indeed of any other existing nuclear State. Under the United States draft there might come about a situation where such so-called non-nuclear States would be able, with the agreement of their nuclear allies, to wage nuclear war against each other. It cannot be doubted that a non-proliferation treaty which allowed such a situation could not fulfil the purpose pursued by the proposal for the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

At the meeting of 23 June the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, pointed out that the United States draft does not preclude the possibility that a so-called non-nuclear State which under the United States draft had obtained full access to the nuclear weapons of one of the existing nuclear States might obtain from a third existing nuclear State its agreement to the use of those weapons (ENDC/PV.267, p.6). This possibility was admitted by Lord Chalfont in his statement of 5 July. In this connexion he said: "We are quite prepared to listen to suggestions concerning how it might be avoided." (ENDC/PV.270, p.31)

The solution of this problem presents no difficulty. It is sufficient to assume the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States, and this problem will cease to exist. There would then be no need to construct artificially the dubious definition of control upon which the United States draft is based. There would be no need to include in the United States draft the concept of a "veto", which in itself shows that this draft provides for the physical transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States.

In this connexion I should like to deal with yet another point. The Western delegations claim in our negotiations that in transferring nuclear weapons the United States does not intend to rely solely upon the right of "veto", but that it also has at its disposal other guarantees in the form of various locks which would make it impossible to use United States nuclear weapons without the decision of the President of the United States of America. It has already been pointed out in the debate that a non-proliferation treaty cannot rely on the existence of certain locks. The very fact that it is necessary to mention these locks and to mount them on the nuclear weapons which would be transferred to non-nuclear States is further proof that the United States draft provides for the physical transfer, the proliferation, of nuclear weapons. At the same time this goes to show the unreliability of the so-called "veto" on which the authors of the draft rely.

Moreover, just as the right of "veto" is unreliable, the claim about locks is also completely unconvincing. By way of illustration I should like to quote just one instance which shows how unreliable these locks are. Last autumn the United

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States press published some interesting information in this regard. For example, on 27 November The New York Times published an article by Mr. John Finney which mentions among other things that in the late 1950's, when negotiations were being conducted on the acquisition of United States nuclear weapons by the Western allies of the United States in NATO -- and here I quote the article --

(continued in English)

"Administration officials gave the impression in public testimony that the warheads would be kept in a separate American stockpile and only turned over in the event of war. But as the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy quickly discovered, the Defense Department had gone a step further by actually mounting the weapons on allied planes. It also discovered that the American controls over the weapons, both on the planes and in the separate stockpiles, at times existed more in principle than in fact."

(continued in Russian)

Yet now the United States delegation is again trying to persuade us that United States control over nuclear weapons would be flawless and that the functioning of the locks would be completely reliable. But who can guarantee that, after a certain time has elapsed, some committee of the United States Senate will not once again find that United States control over the nuclear weapons transferred to non-nuclear States within the framework of NATO exists more in principle than in fact?

On a foundation as shaky as that suggested to us by the delegations of the States members of NATO in the form of the United States draft treaty, it is impossible to reach agreement on an acceptable, really effective treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would meet the criteria that must be set for a treaty of this sort. The need to refer to the right of "veto" and certain locks, as has already been pointed out here, serves in fact merely to confirm that the United States draft does not preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons but, on the contrary, is directly designed to allow for the physical transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States within the framework of NATO and other groupings.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

In the light of the facts to which I have just referred, one question must be posed. Why are the Western delegations constantly manoeuvring on the subject of non-proliferation and stubbornly seeking to restrict the scope of a non-proliferation treaty? Why are they evading the assumption of an obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons by any means or in any form?

The fact is that one member State of the Western alliance is persistently demanding access to nuclear weapons; and the United States, which relies for the attainment of its political objectives in Europe on the Federal Republic of Germany, has decided to pay for this support in the hardest currency -- nuclear weapons. Moreover, this deal is being carried out behind the screen of the need to preserve and consolidate NATO. The attempt to heal its own wounds and solve the internal problems of NATO at the expense of other States interested in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war is a short-sighted and egotistical policy which conceals within itself the seeds of a possible nuclear conflict. A direct consequence of these transactions could be the loss of any hope of concluding a non-proliferation treaty. It seems to me that this is too high a price, if one ponders thoroughly on the consequences to which this policy is likely to lead the whole world.

The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, in his article "Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped?", published in issue No. 4 of the journal "International Organization" for 1965, states on page 857:

(continued in English)

"If there is proliferation of nuclear weapons, there will be no nuclear or other disarmament, and sooner or later these weapons will be used in war, with the possibility, if not the probability, that the largest and most destructive weapons will be used."

(continued in Russian)

That is the price which the world may have to pay later on for the concessions which the United States is now demanding of us for the benefit of its ally, whose nuclear ambitions are not growing any weaker. As we had already repeatedly warned, the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany deemed it necessary to state

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these claims of theirs publicly in a policy statement made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in November 1965, in which it is stated, among other things, that it is time to put an end to a situation in NATO in which -- and I quote from this statement of the West German Government -- "some members of the alliance have their own nuclear weapons at their disposal while others do not. The allies must participate in nuclear defence ...". The demand for nuclear participation within the framework of NATO was also repeated in a note of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany dated 25 March.

Thus we see that nothing has changed in this policy of the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at obtaining access to nuclear weapons. At least we have so far no proof that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced these ambitions. The approach of the United States and the Western delegations to the negotiations on non-proliferation, as well as the wording of the United States draft treaty, are on the contrary direct evidence that the pressure exerted by the Federal Republic of Germany in order to obtain access to nuclear weapons is still going on. Otherwise the Western delegations would not be fighting so strenuously for the retention of the obvious loop-holes in the United States draft, which are intended precisely to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in nuclear armament.

At the 267th meeting of the Committee the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, tried to convince us that the United States does not place the nuclear ambitions of the Federal Republic of Germany above the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. However, up to now the United States has done nothing to substantiate these words. The United States draft treaty on non-proliferation, which provides for the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States within the framework of military groupings, is still on the table of the negotiations as the principal document reflecting this design. Verbal assurances that nuclear weapons cannot come into other hands are more than inadequate in the discussion of a document which is to put the final seal on this situation.

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The President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Mr. A. Novotny, in a conversation with Lord Thomson, aptly remarked of such assurances:

"If this is so clear, then it should be said openly and it should also be laid down in international documents. Everything should be done to prevent any loop-holes which might later be abused. Access to nuclear weapons is being opened up for West Germany either directly or as a co-owner within the framework of NATO, which in our eyes is one and the same thing".

In regard to the plans for nuclear sharing in NATO, we have already on several occasions pointed out that therein lies a direct threat to peace in Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany, whose nuclear ambitions the Western States are seeking to satisfy through NATO, is today the only State in Europe which openly advances territorial claims against its neighbours. The most recent occasion on which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany advanced these claims was in its note of 25 March. The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in plans for the nuclear integration of NATO would only encourage the revanchist forces in that country, who are unwilling to reconcile themselves to the situation established in Europe as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

To leave doors open for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the United States draft treaty demands, would be tantamount to encouraging these peace-endangering tendencies in the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe adopted on 5 July in Bucharest at the meeting of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states:

"At present at the centre of this policy is the demand for the possession of nuclear weapons. In the Federal Republic of Germany strenuous efforts are being made, both openly and secretly, to create a scientific, technical and industrial basis which at a given moment would serve for the production of Germany's own atomic and hydrogen bombs. Through the joint endeavours of the peace-loving countries and peoples it has so far been possible to delay the establishment of a joint NATO nuclear force which would enable

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the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain access to nuclear weapons.

However, the plans in this regard have not been abandoned.

"The fundamental interests of all peoples demand the abandonment of the plan to establish a multilateral NATO nuclear force."

The discussion that has so far taken place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons shows that in the minds of the Western delegations the question of the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the nuclear armament of NATO continues to appear as the only possible alternative for Germany.

The Czechoslovak delegation has already had the opportunity more than once to draw attention to the fact that with regard to Germany there is yet another alternative, the only one capable of solving this problem in accordance with the interests of peace and security in Europe. This second alternative is contained in the constructive proposals of the other sovereign German State -- the German Democratic Republic -- , above all in its proposal that both German States should renounce nuclear weapons on the basis of reciprocity.

I think it appropriate to recall once again the statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic dated 7 February in which it solemnly declared its readiness to assume an obligation, binding under international law, to renounce nuclear weapons if the West German Government stated the same readiness (ENDC/168). At the same time the Government of the German Democratic Republic addressed an appeal to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to make a similar statement, as this would remove a serious obstacle standing in the way of the achievement of an agreement on non-proliferation. The fact that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has so far made no such statement is no accident but merely a further confirmation of our conclusions.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The state of our negotiations on non-proliferation has obliged us to speak frankly once again on these matters, although we would with far greater pleasure have busied ourselves today with the preparation of the final version of a non-proliferation treaty. Our position in the negotiations is dictated by one interest alone: the desire to achieve a non-proliferation treaty which would make any further proliferation of nuclear weapons impossible; and we shall continue to strive for it, since any halfway solution would be an irreparable error entailing catastrophic consequences for the solution of the disarmament question and the ensuring of international peace and security.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin my statement by associating myself with you in welcoming back to our deliberations our colleagues Mrs. Myrdal and Mr. Fisher.

It has been customary, when either the United States or the Soviet Union has accomplished some great feat marking a further stage in the exploration of the cosmos, to extend congratulations. The Canadian delegation is happy to congratulate the astronauts and all the United States scientists, engineers, planners and others who have achieved the latest great success. We wish the intrepid astronauts a safe return.

Thinking of that flight of the astronauts, I had a flight myself: a flight of fancy. I imagined some future time, perhaps not very far distant, when a United States astronaut and a Russian cosmonaut had reached the moon and were returning from it to the earth; but when they were approaching the earth they found that they had no country to return to, only a desert of smoking ruins. Could that be? It could be, if, in contrast to the marvels of brain and will which make the space flights possible, the statesmen and the diplomats who serve them in the two great nations fail to summon up the clear-sightedness, the determination and the courage to take the decisions and to make the compromises that they know to be necessary if the eventual ruin of their civilization is to be avoided -- in short, to control and tame the destructive power of nuclear fission. After that flight of fancy, which has not been a very pleasant one, I return to earth and, with your permission, shall take up our current business, that is, discussion of the draft treaties on non-proliferation which we have before us.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

At our meeting on 5 July the Canadian delegation circulated for the convenience of other delegations a tabular comparison (ENDC/175) of the two draft treaties on non-proliferation which we have had under consideration for some time. We suggested that, in anticipation of the Committee's forthcoming adjournment for the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, concentrated efforts should now be made to establish agreed language on as many articles as possible of those two texts. (ENDC/PV.270, p.19). Today I should like to carry this process a stage further by going through the two drafts in some detail. Before doing so, however, I should like to say how pleased we were that our Mexican colleague adopted a similar approach at the meeting last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.274). Mr. Gomez Robledo had some very pertinent comments to make on the two drafts, and I shall mention some of those during my remarks. A re-reading of his statement has only confirmed what we felt when we first heard it. I might also observe that the approach of comparing the texts appears to commend itself to the major nuclear Powers. At a press conference on 5 July President Johnson said:

"We're doing everything we can to reach a decision on such a treaty. We are very anxious to do it and we hope the Soviet Union will meet us and find an acceptable compromise in language which we can both live with ... We're going to do everything within the power of our most imaginative people to find language that will bring the nuclear Powers together in a treaty that will provide non-proliferation. We think it's one of the most important decisions of our time, and we're going to do everything to bring people together on it."

A week ago in this Committee the Soviet representative said that the Soviet Union was prepared, through a detailed comparison of the two drafts, to "outline more clearly the possibilities of agreeing on a text which would ensure an effective solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.273, p.14). Those statements have encouraged the Canadian delegation to speak about a few points where these efforts might bear early fruit.

In our view, examination of the two draft treaties will show that there are quite a few topics -- perhaps a majority of the topics -- on which agreement already exists, in whole or in very large part; and this applies not only to peripheral topics. Of course, it is also evident that further work is required on some other topics, both major and minor, with which both the treaties deal.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Finally, certain topics are included in only one draft; both Soviet Union and United States texts contain items which are not common to both. This does not necessarily mean that the two sides differ in principle or in detail on those points; it is merely that they are not contained in the other draft treaty. The most obvious example is probably that of safeguards. The Soviet representative has said (ENDC/PV.245, pp. 35, 36) that he is prepared to consider that question, although the Soviet draft treaty contains no reference to it. In the United States draft, on the other hand, article III deals solely with that question. As the Committee is aware, it is the view of the Canadian Government that a non-proliferation treaty should contain a strong article on safeguards. We hope that that matter will receive early attention.

Turning now to the preamble as set forth in the comparative table, it would seem to the Canadian delegation that there is not much difference in principle between the clauses in the Soviet Union draft and those in the United States draft. In some cases clauses could be combined; on other points, both clauses could be included. The major point of difference would appear to relate to the reference to nuclear disarmament. Here I refer to the fifth and sixth preambular clauses of the United States draft, and the third and fourth preambular clauses of the Soviet draft. In our view, the preamble should certainly contain language reaffirming our desire to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament at an early date; on the other hand, all of us will agree, I think, that the preamble of a non-proliferation treaty should not be used to prejudge the contents and phrasing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, those minor points should not present serious obstacles, and agreement should not be too difficult.

The fifth preambular clause of the United States draft purports to state the desire of the nuclear Powers to reduce the nuclear threat, even before an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It may thus go some way to satisfy the desire for a balancing of obligations which has been expressed frequently by non-aligned delegations. It might be combined with the Soviet Union's fourth preambular clause regarding the easing of tension. In our view, it might even be possible to agree to make the resulting clause stronger than either of the present ones: to affirm in it that the treaty should be followed by early agreements among the nuclear States to contain the nuclear threat. In summary, the preamble appears to us to be one of the areas in which complete agreement should be relatively easy and would constitute a useful forward step.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I should now like to turn to article II of the draft treaty. I deal with this article as it covers the obligations of non-nuclear countries, such as Canada. Article II, of course, reflects article I, which deals with the obligations of nuclear-weapon Powers. For purposes of this discussion, I include the concepts dealt with in the Soviet article III and the United States article IV, which are very closely related to the obligations in article II.

It is generally agreed that those articles are the core provisions needed for an acceptable non-proliferation treaty, although they would not, of course, be the only significant ones. Therefore it is encouraging that agreement already appears to exist on several important elements of those core provisions. As our Italian colleague remarked on 12 July:

"It would therefore be false to state that, in respect of the whole basic problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is a disagreement between the nuclear Powers participating in this Conference. Moreover, the agreement that exists in regard to production is certainly not negligible. What I think we should do is to indicate officially in our report the existence of this initial, albeit partial, identity of views between the Soviet Union and the United States." (ENDC/PV.272, p.28)

For the sake of clarity, and continuing the process which I initiated at our meeting on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254), I shall divide the concepts involved in article II into three categories: (a) provisions relating to manufacture; (b) provisions relating to transfers; and (c) other actions. With regard to manufacture, the United States treaty first stages:

"Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this treaty undertakes:

"1. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons ..." (ENDC/152/Add.1)

The Soviet treaty, for its part, says:

"1. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States." (ENDC/164, p.5)

Secondly, the United States draft requires non-nuclear-weapon States to undertake:

"2. Not to seek or receive, and not to provide, whether alone or in any association of non-nuclear-weapon States:

"(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons." (ENDC/152/Add.1)

The Soviet draft reads:

"2. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to obtain or seek to obtain, from States possessing nuclear weapons, assistance in the manufacture of such weapons or relevant manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture ... of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/164, p.5)

I would point out that the Soviet draft also prohibits those actions for purposes of the use of nuclear weapons; and I shall return to that point later on.

Thus it seems clear to the Canadian delegation that both drafts concur that a non-nuclear State party to the treaty should agree not to create or manufacture nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States. Such a non-nuclear-weapon State should also not seek or receive from any source and not provide assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture or in the testing of nuclear weapons, or encouragement or inducement to manufacture its own nuclear weapons. In other words, in our view it would not be at all difficult to agree upon the wording of the part of article II -- and of article I -- concerning non-manufacture, if the sponsors of the draft treaties really wished to do so.

It is in the possibility of manufacture, it seems to the Canadian delegation, that the greatest danger of proliferation at present exists. Therefore the almost total agreement that appears to exist on that point in the two drafts is most encouraging. We hope that that coincidence of views will soon be formalized in treaty language.

With regard to transfer, two possible types of proliferation appear to be involved. The first is clear and direct. It could, for example, be the simple gift or sale of nuclear weapons by a nuclear State into the possession of a non-nuclear State. Everyone seems to agree that that should not be done -- nor, in our view, is it likely that it would be done by any of the present nuclear Powers. So we should be able to agree that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty should undertake not to seek or to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into their control.

However, there is a second type of transfer which it is possible to imagine. I refer to paragraph 2(a) of resolution 2028 (XX), which states:

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate ... indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form" (ENDC/161).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That could encompass quite a range of actions, including illegal or clandestine activities of nationals of a State -- or even an accident. But the area where the greatest attention has been focussed so far has been that of military alliances; and here, quite frankly and obviously, agreement has not yet been possible. The problem seems to be how to ensure that the principle to which we all adhere: that proliferation shall not take place indirectly, can be translated into treaty language in such a way that, on the one hand, no loop-holes are left and, on the other, there is no improper interference -- that is to say, interference beyond the requirements of preventing proliferation -- with the legitimate right of nations to take measures collectively for their defence.

Turning to the draft treaty articles, both texts contain clear prohibitions of direct transfers. The Soviet draft states:

"1. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons ... also undertake to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form -- directly ..."

(ENDC/164, p.5)

The United States text reads:

"Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes:

"1. ... not to seek or to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into its national control ..." (ENDC/152/Add.1)

Thus it would seem to the Canadian delegation that this section on transfer could be divided into two parts and that for the first part -- which prohibits direct transfer in any way -- it should not be particularly difficult to find a common language.

The second part, regarding indirect transfers, presents the main difficulties with which this Committee has been faced in its discussions. The Soviet Union delegation has objected to a number of points in the United States draft: for example, on the definition of control and the idea of a veto. I think that the United States delegation has already replied fully to those arguments, most recently at our 274th meeting.

The Soviet text, on the other hand, as I sought to show on 5 July (ENDC/PV.270, pp. 12 et seq.), is not above criticism. It contains a number of references to the "use" of nuclear weapons. The Canadian and other Western delegations have already made their position clear on this point. We have stated that it is quite unacceptable to us that a non-proliferation treaty should attempt to prohibit normal consultations on possible use of nuclear weapons in the common defence against a possible nuclear attack.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Finally, there is a third "core" provision in both texts. Both drafts contain provisions against States taking any other action which would result in proliferation; we wonder, therefore, whether there might not be agreement on language providing that a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty should not take any other action which would encourage or result in the acquisition of control of nuclear weapons by itself or any other non-nuclear-weapon State in any way, for example through units of its armed forces or its military personnel, even if such units or personnel were under the command of a military alliance.

Article IV of the Soviet draft treaty is more easily discussed in conjunction with articles VI of the treaties; so I shall pass over it for the moment.

Turning to article V, I would suggest that the co-Chairmen could agree, without much debate, to put an agreed text for that article into the centre column of document ENDC/175. The representative of Mexico discussed those clauses on 19 July (ENDC/PV.274, p.14), and we should like to hear the views of the sponsors of the draft on his observations before we ourselves comment further. We certainly agree with the representative of Mexico that the treaty should not enter into force until a number of non-nuclear States have ratified it.

Article VI of the Soviet treaty is very similar to the corresponding article of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The United States article VI contains a provision for a State which wishes to withdraw from the treaty, in the event that it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country, to give notice to other parties and to the United Nations Security Council, together with a statement of explanation.

The United States treaty also provides for a conference to review the treaty after a certain number of years. This provision would appear to allow for the proposal of amendments; although it does not do so as specifically as the Soviet Union article IV. However, the United States provisions would seem to have other advantages, such as allowing non-nuclear parties to the treaty to take account of the progress made towards reduction of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers.

Finally, we think that the two articles VII could be transcribed immediately into the centre column of document ENDC/175, as the wording is identical.

There have been two suggestions for possible additions to the non-proliferation treaty. One, which was put forward by the representative of Mexico on 19 July, has to do with denuclearized zones (ENDC/PV.274, pp. 15 et seq.). Whilst we have not yet

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

had time to study that proposal in any detail, at first sight it would appear to us not to present any serious difficulty. The other is the Soviet delegation's suggestion (ENDC/PV.267, p.12) for the inclusion of an article providing that nuclear Powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. The Canadian delegation is not yet in a position to state firm views on that point. We might remark that we are not a nuclear Power, expected to take that pledge of partial abstinence; nor, as a non-nuclear ally of a nuclear Power, could we benefit from that proposal.

Summing up what I have said, it seems to the Canadian delegation that this Committee should conclude that there are a significant number of topics on which agreement exists now or is very close. There are other topics on which further concentrated discussion is required. When I speak of "topics", I mean the various categories into which the provisions of the draft treaties are divided. The purpose of my intervention today has been, first, to draw attention to the topics on which agreement is near and thus to encourage our co-Chairmen in the first instance to proceed with drafting language to embody the present points of agreement and, secondly, to intensify efforts to narrow the differences on topics where we are not yet fully in accord. Even if complete identity of views on all topics may not prove possible by the end of this session, it would nevertheless be a respectable achievement to take back to the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly common language on the many important points where there is agreement in detail or at least in principle.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to join you in welcoming the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, on their return to the Committee.

We have listened with great interest today to the most interesting statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia. The arguments which he put forward elaborate most convincingly the point of view which we too hold on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons now under consideration by the Committee. We have listened to the statement of the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns. On the questions which he has raised in his statement we too intend today to express the views of our delegation.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall now go on to state our views on the question under consideration by the Committee. The debate in the Committee is revealing more and more clearly how the participants in the negotiations approach the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Besides the nuances in the positions of this or that delegation, two concepts of non-proliferation can be seen. There is the broad concept which, as the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, said at the last meeting (ENDC/PV.274, p.10), is gaining ground. There is also the tendency to narrow the very concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and accordingly to restrict the range of measures which should be taken in order to prevent proliferation.

It could be stressed that measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, like measures to prevent the spread of an epidemic, cannot be half-measures, because in such a case they will not achieve their purpose. It could be pointed out that the effective solution of the problem of non-proliferation would create more favourable opportunities for the solution of other problems of disarmament. However, at the present stage of the negotiations it is hardly necessary to demonstrate the advantages of one approach over another. The Committee has before it two draft treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a concrete comparison of the provisions of these drafts will perhaps help to elucidate the meaning of the differences in the positions of the socialist States on the one hand and of the Western States on the other.

The principal provisions of both the Soviet and the United States drafts are contained in the first two articles, which set out the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear States respectively in regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States now recognizes in its draft that certain prerogatives in respect of nuclear weapons must not be granted either to third States or associations of States or to units of the armed forces or military personnel of other States even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. But what precisely are the prerogatives that must not be granted? They are defined by the word "control", and the meaning which the United States side now gives to that word is specified in article IV of the United States draft, which stipulates in its sub-paragraph (c): "'Control' means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State" (ENDC/152/Add.1).

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation has already pointed out on a previous occasion that the United States gave a much broader meaning to the concept of "control" when, for example, twenty years ago the question of atomic weapons was being discussed at the United Nations. The members of the Committee are also aware that the General Assembly of the United Nations has always been guided in its approach to the problem of non-proliferation by a broader conception of what precisely proliferation is; but, however that may be, we have to deal with that concept of the problem which is now put forward by the United States. What is to be prohibited and what is to be allowed under the United States draft treaty?

In the first place -- and this is very important -- the United States does not prohibit, and consequently it proposes to allow, the transfer of nuclear weapons for the armament of a non-nuclear State and its national forces. Nuclear weapons can be transferred to the command of a military alliance, to units of the armed forces and to individual military personnel. The recipients of the nuclear weapons have in this case to promise not to use these weapons of their own initiative. In the opinion of the United States side we should not regard such a transfer as proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, I repeat, the United States proposes that the transfer by nuclear Powers of nuclear bombs and warheads to non-nuclear States should not be considered and should not be called proliferation.

The United States Delegation tries to justify such a narrow and qualified concept of non-proliferation by claiming that the nuclear weapons transferred would in any case be, as it were, a dead weight in the hands of other States and that they would not be able to use them. But that is not so at all. The States which received nuclear weapons would, of course, be able to use them, otherwise there would be no point in their receiving them. There are at least two ways in which the nuclear weapons received by them could be used.

One way which, as is evident from the explanations given by the United States delegation, the United States considers quite allowable is that some nuclear Power would give permission for the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, under the United States draft treaty it could turn out in the end that States which do not at present possess nuclear weapons would make war by means of those weapons. The United States solution of the problem of non-proliferation explicitly provides for such a possibility. This, of course, is not a solution of the problem of non-proliferation at all.

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The other way is that a State which had received nuclear weapons would, in order to carry out its aggressive designs or revanchist policies, use those weapons without anyone's permission. Moreover, that could be done not only by a State but also by an individual military commander or group of military personnel, because the United States draft treaty allows the transfer of nuclear weapons directly to units of the armed forces or military personnel of other States on the same conditions: namely, with the obligation not to use those weapons without permission.

Such a concept of non-proliferation has, of course, nothing to do with the solution of the problem of genuine non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. States are being asked to make their security dependent upon whether a State or individual general or group of military personnel that has received nuclear weapons would keep its word in regard to their use. No responsible government could agree to such a step, which would mean agreeing to nuclear chaos.

The representatives of the United States claim that the "right of veto" would be safeguarded by physical means, namely electronic locks. However, we have yet to hear from the United States delegation an explanation of why these locks cannot be opened by evil-doers. In this connexion the Soviet delegation cannot but agree with the views expressed today on that subject by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cernik, who dealt very thoroughly and convincingly with the question of locks. It is well known that locks do not afford protection against thieves, nor would they afford protection against people who are determined to use the nuclear weapons in their possession. No lock can be such a reliable means of preventing the use of nuclear weapons as when there are no such weapons in the hands of a particular State or particular body of military personnel. But the transfer of such weapons, even if equipped with locks, would create opportunities to open the locks and to use the nuclear weapons that had been acquired.

Moreover, even the representatives of the Western Powers themselves see such a possibility. This is evident from Lord Chalfont's statement about the need to determine, in a treaty on non-proliferation, the responsibility for a violation of the treaty arising from the transfer of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.270, p.37). As we have already said, the Soviet delegation cannot agree with such a concept of non-proliferation in which, under the guise of non-proliferation, we are asked to allow the physical proliferation of nuclear weapons or, as it was described by the

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representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, the objective proliferation of such weapons (ENDC/PV.274, pp.10 et seq.) Such an opinion --- that is, the opinion embodied in the United States concept -- undermines the very idea of non-proliferation, since it leads to an increase in the number of people capable of using nuclear weapons and to the proliferation of these weapons throughout the world.

The Soviet Union sees in the very fact of the transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State a perfectly obvious proliferation of nuclear weapons and deems it necessary to prevent such a development. Article I of the Soviet draft treaty prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons into the ownership or control of non-nuclear States or groups of States. The Soviet delegation sees in this prohibition an unquestionable advantage of the Soviet draft over the United States draft. Such a conception of the problem, such a solution of the question precludes all the possibilities of abuse which have been mentioned in connexion with the United States proposals. In order to make this solution really exhaustive and to close all ways to the ownership or control of nuclear weapons, article I of the Soviet draft also prohibits the granting to non-nuclear States or groups of States of the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons.

Since, within the framework of military alliances and not only within that framework, there can take place a transfer of nuclear weapons direct to units of the armed forces or to military personnel, we propose to provide for the prohibition of that kind of transfer as well. The relevant provision is contained in the second clause of paragraph 1 of article I of the Soviet draft, which reads:

"The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or over their emplacement and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance." (ENDC/164, p.5)

As can be seen from what I have said, article I of the Soviet draft treaty, in contrast to article I of the United States draft, effectively solves the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons by precluding any possibility of acquisition of such weapons by non-nuclear countries from nuclear States. The

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article in the Soviet draft treaty is based on the broad conception of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, for which many members of the Committee have expressed support.

In regard to the United States draft, article I of that draft has the further defect that it provides for the possibility of transferring the right to use nuclear weapons to alliances of States. Under that formula it can be reckoned that at present three Western nuclear Powers dispose of three "patents" for the use of nuclear weapons. The "patent" of one of those Powers can be transferred, for example, to NATO or to some other grouping of States. That, according to the United States draft, would not "cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/152/Add.1). But would not that be proliferation? Instead of one nuclear Power there would be several States with nuclear weapons at their disposal, including the right to use them. As the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, rightly pointed out on 19 July, the territorial area in which nuclear weapons are located would be extended (ENDC/PV.274, p.12). The inclusion of such a formula in a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the very idea of such a treaty.

All the aforementioned considerations also apply fully to article II. Both in the Soviet and in the United States drafts, article II concerns the obligations of the non-nuclear States parties to the treaty. I do not want to dwell on that article in this statement. It will suffice to point out that under the United States draft treaty that article creates loop-holes for non-nuclear States in exactly the same way as article I creates them for nuclear States. Thus the number of loop-holes is doubled.

It is obvious that the approach of the United States to the very concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons differs radically from the approach of the Soviet Union and, as the debate has shown, from the approach of other States, except those which have formally endorsed the United States position. This difference in conception is explained by the fact that the point of view of the United States is determined by military and political considerations which have nothing to do with the aim of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States evidently regards the physical transfer of nuclear weapons as a means of preventing the disintegration of the military bloc which it has built up. Accordingly, the

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United States draft keeps the possibility of giving access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States.

But it is impossible to solve the problem of non-proliferation in such a way. A non-proliferation treaty must close all the ways to proliferation of nuclear weapons without any exceptions. The solution of this problem, which affects the security of all the countries of the world, must have priority over the political calculations and plans of individual States. As long as the United States maintains its present position in this regard and makes the drafting of a non-proliferation treaty depend on the power politics which it is carrying out, the work of the Committee on this problem cannot hope to make any progress. What is needed is not formal amendments such as those submitted by the United States in March this year, to which the United States delegation refers in trying to conceal the absence of any changes for the better on its part, but realistic propositions providing for measures to ensure genuine non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The participants in the negotiations are aware that the Soviet Government is prepared to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territory. This position of the Soviet side, and the wording of a corresponding provision of the treaty which the Soviet delegation put forward by way of example on 23 July (ENDC/PV.267, p.12) are meeting with the support and approval of many members of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation also takes a positive view of the idea expressed by the Mexican delegation that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should include an article providing that nothing in the treaty shall affect adversely the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to guarantee the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories (ENDC/PV.274, pp.15 et seq). We have already had occasion to state -- and, since this question has lately been raised again in the Committee, we repeat -- that the Soviet Union would be prepared to examine the question of how control measures, that is, safeguards worked out by the International Atomic Energy Agency, could be used in connexion with the treaty on non-proliferation.

We should now like to refer to the proposal of the Canadian delegation -- which was also elaborated by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, in his statement today -- that we should establish agreed language on those points of the

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treaty on which we are able to reach agreement. In order that the Eighteen-Nation Committee might at least be able to report to the United Nations General Assembly some tangible results of its work, the Canadian delegation proposed that those formulations in regard to which no differences of principle arise should be transcribed, as an agreed text, into the working document which it had submitted (ENDC/175). Indeed, a comparison of the Soviet and United States draft treaties shows that they contain, for example, such textually similar articles as V and VII. Apparently to finalize an agreed text of those articles would not present much difficulty.

However, it is necessary to point out the following circumstance. The provisions in question concern such matters as signature, ratification, registration of the treaty, its duration, etc. The question arises whether we shall be concentrating our efforts in the right direction if we take up now in the first place the drafting of agreed provisions on these matters. Moreover, even without filling in the column reserved in the Canadian working document for agreed texts, we can see where the similarity lies and what the differences are between the draft submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States. In these circumstances will not the filling in of that column be merely a semblance of the achievement of tangible results -- a semblance which would delude neither ourselves nor the United Nations General Assembly?

Real progress in the drafting of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons depends on overcoming the substantive differences in the meaning which is given to the concept of non-proliferation by the United States on the one hand and by the Soviet Union and other countries on the other. Therefore, if we state that we have succeeded in agreeing on the question of the authenticity of the languages of the treaty -- and in this regard there is nothing to be agreed -- we shall still be just as far from solving the problem of non-proliferation as we are at this moment. In these circumstances, to create an impression of some sort of progress in the negotiations on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -- a progress that would be imaginary -- would merely spread vain illusions about the real state of affairs in this matter, and would in fact delude the public opinion of the countries.

In order to avoid this, the article-by-article comparison and analysis of the Soviet Union and United States draft treaties should, we are convinced, begin with the principal, key questions. The procedure suggested by the Canadian delegation

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could prove useful only if it led to the achievement of agreed texts for the basic provisions of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, unless there were agreement on the basic provisions it would be difficult for us at present to examine, for example, the question of withdrawal from the treaty. The question would arise: withdrawal from what treaty? What does this treaty provide, even in regard to all the other subsequent articles which we mentioned -- signature, ratification, and so on? But we cannot even answer the questions ratification of what treaty, signature of what treaty, amendments to what treaty?

Therefore the whole system and working procedure proposed by Mr. Burns contains a very unsound basis: namely the basis that, without having solved the basic problem of the contents of the treaty, we try to settle those questions which, in our opinion, would not cause any difficulties at all if it were clear to us what a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be. In this situation the Canadian delegation either cannot give us such a concept, or, if it can, then it gives us one which we do not accept and with which we do not agree.

In order to carry out the instructions of the General Assembly we must concentrate all our attention on the provisions which define the main obligations of the parties to a non-proliferation treaty. We must show the will and the determination to succeed in formulating these obligations in a way which would answer the purpose of effectively preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by any means, direct or indirect. Given a businesslike and constructive approach by all the delegations, that problem can be solved even during the present session. The Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation shows our delegation's approach. The approach of the Western delegations is shown by the draft which they support.

As we have already stressed more than once, the entire content of the United States draft treaty is subordinated to certain political aims which the United States is pursuing: namely to legalize the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the NATO military bloc and, above all, to ensure access to atomic arsenals for Western Germany. That is a dangerous policy. On the question whether or not to allow the revanchist forces of the Federal Republic of Germany to have access to nuclear weapons there can be no compromise. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, firmly defending the cause of peace, will never agree to the nuclear armament of West Germany.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the participants in the negotiations to the clause in the Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty countries which states:

"Bearing in mind the threat to the cause of peace in Europe represented by the nuclear claims of the Federal Republic of Germany, States must direct all their efforts towards precluding the possibility of the Federal Republic of Germany being allowed access to nuclear weapons in any form whatever, directly or indirectly through groupings of States, through exclusive control or in the form of participation in the control of such weapons. On the way in which this question is decided the future of the peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe, will largely depend. In this matter halfway solutions cannot be tolerated."

We declare once more that we consider it impossible to reach agreement on the basis of the concept of non-proliferation embodied in the United States draft treaty, which in fact leads to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States must make important changes in its position on this question. Otherwise the Committee will not be able to make headway in solving the question of non-proliferation or to report any real achievement in this direction to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): Before I make the few brief remarks that I intend to make, let me join in welcoming Mrs. Myrdal and Mr. Fisher back to our deliberations. Let me say also how extremely useful and constructive I found the contribution of the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, this morning. It seems to me that adopting that sort of approach to the problem is making a real and positive advance in the work we are trying to do in order to arrive at agreement on both principles and the drafting of a non-proliferation treaty. Perhaps I might mention the contribution made -- although I was not present at the time -- by the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.274), a contribution which my delegation has studied with very great interest and admiration.

As far as the two speeches made this morning by Mr. Roshchin and the representative of Czechoslovakia are concerned, I should of course like to withhold any detailed or studied comment on those speeches until later. However, perhaps I might comment

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first of all on one point made by Mr. Roshchin which it seems to me necessary to pick up at once: that is, the curious logical device by which he seemed to suggest that the Western alliance was in favour of the nuclear rearmament of Western Germany, by stating in ringing tones that his Government would never agree to the nuclear rearmament of Western Germany. If he was suggesting, by saying that, that we are in favour of such nuclear rearmament, I think it should be made clear at once that of course we are not. All we are talking about here is a means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear country; and that in our view includes the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Western Germany.

However, my main reason for asking for the floor for a few minutes was to comment on some of the points made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, largely because in making his remarks he seemed to draw to a disproportionate extent on mine. He began by saying that the West --- and I assume, by implication, the United Kingdom --- had created a number of artificial difficulties about the Soviet draft. He then went on to elaborate a number of difficulties about the Western draft which I suppose we are meant to assume were not artificial.

The first point I should like to take up specifically is by way of destroying what I think is a fallacy in logic and a piece of false suggestion on the part of the representative of Czechoslovakia, who said that he and his colleagues on his side had demonstrated that the Western definition of proliferation was a false one and a wrong one. I should like to point out that of course he has demonstrated nothing of the sort; he has only said it, and that is an entirely different thing.

He went on to give a quotation from my recent speech about the possibility put forward earlier that a third nuclear Power might authorize a non-nuclear Power to use nuclear weapons in spite of the veto of the original nuclear Power under whose sponsorship or veto the weapons had been given. He quoted me very selectively to suggest that, because I had said I was willing to listen to suggestions concerning how that might be avoided, I therefore regarded it as a real danger. Perhaps I could ask Mr. Cernik to go back to the procès-verbal of my speech (ENDC/PV.270, p.31), where he will see that, before saying that, I had characterized it as a bizarre and unlikely situation. I think that if he will put that remark in proper context he will see exactly what I think of the possibility that such a thing might happen.

I was particularly worried about the emphasis which he placed --- and in this he seemed to be supported to some extent by the representative of the Soviet Union --- on the uselessness of electronic locks and vetoes on the use of nuclear weapons. I

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

should like to make a point probably familiar to everyone here: that such devices as electronic permissive action links and other forms of control over the use of nuclear weapons are an integral part of a system of command and control designed to ensure that nuclear weapons, as long as they have to exist, are not fired by miscalculation or by evil intent or by mechanical accident; and I think the suggestion that these devices are in some way undesirable or useless is one that ought to be dismissed from our minds. Indeed, if Mr. Cernik is really suggesting that we should be better off without electronic locks and a system of vetoes, it might be as well if he were to say so. I am not quite sure that it would have much effect on the way in which these matters are arranged; but it would be nice at least to know if that is how he views the position.

In this context, I think it was curious that he should have attempted to demonstrate again the unreliability of electronic locks by quoting from a newspaper story in which the journalist said that a number of United States officials had given the impression that the efficacy of these locks existed more in principle than in fact. I think that in a matter of this kind, of this importance and of this technical complexity, it really is not enough to demonstrate the uselessness of electronic locks by quoting what a journalist has said to be the impression given by unnamed United States officials. Most journalists are distinguished, but some are less distinguished than others. I should not like it to be thought, because of that one news story appearing in one newspaper, that what was suggested there is in fact the state of affairs.

Finally, I might come back for a moment, as I have already come back before, perhaps too often, to this deplorable habit of suggesting that the ideas of one's antagonist in a debate are in some way artificial and not worth serious consideration while those of oneself are of course entirely admirable, cogent and full of objectivity. I think that we might get along better and make more progress if we were to drop that position of asymmetry.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French) I should like to make a few brief comments on this morning's meeting, which in some respects has been very interesting.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

When the Soviet representative began his statement, I was glad to hear him say that he intended to make a comparative examination of the two draft treaties. In my opinion that is indeed the right method for us to adopt. What was said on this subject by the representative of Canada and the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.270), and also the very interesting statement made by the representative of Mexico at our last meeting, prove that it is indeed by comparing the two texts that we can find important points of agreement and a basis for useful work.

Unfortunately I soon realized that my optimism was premature and that, although Mr. Roshchin had in fact begun to examine the two texts, he soon came to the conclusion that such a comparison was quite useless if there were no agreement on the essence of non-proliferation. Mr. Roshchin spoke among other things, I believe, about denunciation of the treaty. He asked what would be the point of discussing denunciation of the treaty if we did not yet have a treaty. But he avoided speaking about certain very essential and important matters which Mr. Burns stressed this morning and on which there is agreement. As I have said, these are not secondary matters. I think that the representative of Canada mentioned the agreement that exists on prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and assistance in their manufacture. That is a very important point which, I believe, Mr. Roshchin neglected.

I must note unfortunately that there is still a striking difference between the delegations of the East and those of the West in the way in which they approach this problem. The delegations of Eastern Europe seek to single out the divergencies and aggravate them; whereas we, on the contrary, seek to single out the agreements and parallelisms in order to develop them. I believe that if this method of singling out divergencies rather than agreements continues, the results of our work may well be negative.

I should like to take up another point in Mr. Roshchin's statement. I thought I heard him say at one moment that within the framework of the United States draft treaty there were two ways of using nuclear weapons: the first with the consent of a nuclear Power, and the second without its consent. It seems that it is not so much the provisions themselves of the draft treaty that prevent the Soviet delegation from accepting it; that it is not the provisions of the United States draft treaty that are considered so negative! It seems that it is rather the possibility that these provisions may be infringed, exceeded, or rendered useless by force or by a violation of the treaty.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

If one were to adopt such a view, it would be absolutely futile to negotiate a treaty here. Certainly any treaty can be violated, any arrangement upset, if one acts in bad faith. The principle expounded by Mr. Roshchin would prevent even a deployment in an alliance where nuclear forces under the strict control of a nuclear Power would be alongside the conventional forces of a non-nuclear Power; because even in the deployment of an alliance there could always be an attack by conventional forces against the defences of nuclear weapons in the ownership and possession of a nuclear country.

For my part I consider that, when one negotiates a treaty, one must start from the assumption that it is being negotiated in good faith and will be respected, and that those who subsequently violated the treaty would thereby become outlaws and suffer the direct consequences.

Those are the brief comments that I wished to make this morning.

Mr. ROSHCIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian). At this point I should just like to give a brief explanation to the representative of Italy concerning our conception and our views on the subject of the possibility of violating the treaty in two ways. The first way -- as we have pointed out and explained -- can be accomplished with the consent of the nuclear Power which has transferred the nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State. A non-nuclear State obtains this consent and thus a non-nuclear State uses the weapons. That is the first way.

There is also a second way, namely outright violation, when a non-nuclear State uses nuclear weapons without the permission of the Power which has transferred those nuclear weapons to it. But this possibility of violation is inherent in the United States draft treaty. No such possibility of violation is inherent in the treaty submitted by the Soviet Union. Why? Because the United States draft treaty provides for the transfer of nuclear weapons and, in order to violate the treaty, it is necessary to use the nuclear weapons which have already been received, without the consent of the Power which has transferred them. But we do not provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons, and that is why our draft does not allow even the possibility of such a violation of the treaty.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

This is the most important, I would say the cardinal difference -- or one of the cardinal differences -- between the United States and the Soviet draft treaties: namely, that the Soviet treaty does not even allow of the possibility of its violation, because a non-nuclear State, having no nuclear weapons, cannot use them. It simply cannot violate the treaty, because it has no such weapons. Under the United States treaty the weapons would be handed over, but they would be handed over together with a certain lock, a lock which would prevent them from being used.

In this connexion I should also like to make a comment on the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom. He said that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries regard locks as useless. I must say that the point raised by us -- as far as I understood the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cernik, and as far as we ourselves are concerned -- is not about the uselessness of locks. The point is that the locks can be opened. In one of our statements we have said (ENDC/PV.269, p.34) that we admit that the locks exist today, even that they function today, and that they may even function effectively today. But we cannot admit that these locks will function, and function effectively, tomorrow. And in any case the security of States cannot be based on certain electronic locks which, as we know, could be opened in the course of time and as a result of technological advance.

Therefore our main point which we have been putting forward here is not that locks are useless; but we say that in the case in question locks can be opened, and that to base an international agreement and the international security of States -- of the States of the whole world -- upon these locks is, of course, impossible. It is impossible to base them on so vague a proposition, in connexion with which we have not even been able to obtain an answer from the United States representative to the question whether or not the locks could ultimately be opened. Notwithstanding his very long statement at the last meeting, he bypassed this question. He did not answer it; and, of course, we noted that no reply was forthcoming.

I should like to make one comment on the statement of the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, that we prefer to inflate the differences, whereas the Western representatives wish, on the contrary, not to inflate these differences but to find a means of resolving them. But we put the question in a different way. We put the

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

question in this way: is it permissible to give world public opinion, the public opinion of States, the impression that we are at present agreeing articles on ratification, on withdrawal from the treaty, on the languages in which the treaty will be written, and on a number of other provisions? What will be the good of doing that? I should say that the result would be negative. We should mislead world public opinion, the General Assembly and possibly the public opinion of the member States of the Committee as well.

Why? Because in reality there is between us no agreement in principle on what should be regarded as non-proliferation and how to approach the solution of the non-proliferation problem. We say that we must not transfer nuclear weapons, and you say "No; nuclear weapons may be transferred to non-nuclear States, but on condition that they shall not use them, and that there will be a right of veto and that there will be locks". We cannot agree to this conception, and that is why there is no agreement between us. If we were to undertake the work proposed here by Mr. Burns and Mr. Cavalletti, then we should in that case be taking the wrong road; we should not be seeking ways to solve the basic problems, but we should be concentrating our attention during the very limited time left to us on secondary questions which provide no solution to our problem of principle and would not bring us an inch closer to solving the basic problem which divides us.

That is the point. That is why I wish to refute the allegation of the Italian representative that we do not want to seek agreement and therefore reject the ways towards it that are proposed to us. We reject them because they do not lead to a realistic, genuine solution of the problem but are likely to mislead public opinion. Naturally we do not want this and we have, of course, no intention of following that path.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I would simply ask Mr. Roshchin whether he considers absolutely negligible the agreement which, it seems, exists on the prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons and of assistance in their manufacture.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian). What I would say is that the questions which have been solved in the agreement can be seen by collating the Soviet text and the United States text, where perhaps the respective positions coincide. But at the same time I should like to stress that the United States draft treaty is drafted in such a way that its main centre of gravity is precisely in the definition of control. Therefore, even if several texts of the Soviet and the United States drafts coincide, the structure of the United States draft treaty is contrived in such a way that it relates the basic difference to another provision which in fact presents and interprets the basic provision of the treaty in an entirely different light. Taking the United States draft treaty as it stands, I could say that, for example, article I in the United States draft can in no way be understood independently of article IV, which contains the key to the explanation; and that key, of course, nullifies in substance the concept which might have been drawn from article I.

That is why I wish to say that, no matter how we understand certain apparent similarities in the United States and the Soviet draft treaties, there is in fact no basic similarity. There is no similarity in regard to what non-proliferation is, with what criterion and what conception we approach the solution of this basic problem; here there are radical differences in our respective positions. That is what we have been talking about during a great many meetings of the Committee. We have to regret that in this respect the Western Powers have not budged from the position about which we have said that it cannot serve as a basis for our negotiations here in the Committee.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): This has been a very lively exchange of views among the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies, and I think it has been a very interesting exchange in regard to the differences separating them. As the Indian delegation pointed out some time ago (ENDC/PV.263, pp. 8 et seq.), there is a certain amount of similarity in the approach of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies. The basic difference among the nuclear-weapon Powers is, as Mr. Roshchin pointed out, in regard to dissemination properly so called, in regard to the question of transfer of nuclear weapons. It is on that issue that a settlement has to be reached between the differing opinions of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Mr. Cavalletti asked a question about a separate issue: the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That is a separate issue altogether. It is not something which concerns the nuclear-weapon Powers alone. In fact, it is not only a question of the nuclear-weapon Powers telling the non-nuclear-weapon Powers: "Thou shalt not manufacture"; it is a question -- as we have repeated in the past and shall say in the future -- of balanced obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon Powers.

The issue that has been raised and the lively exchange of views that has taken place concern mainly, as Mr. Roshchin rightly pointed out, the question of dissemination. The issue to be settled concerns the question of the transfer of nuclear weapons and the receipt of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon technology.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 275th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of U Maung Maung Gyi, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Canada, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Italy and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 26 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

